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ABSTRACT
Third-party tracking is common on almost all commercially oper-
ated websites. Prior work has studied in detail the extent of third-
party tracking on the web, detection of third-party trackers, and
defending against third-party tracking. Existing research and tools
have also attempted to inform web users of trackers and the extent
of their privacy violations. However, existing tools do not take into
account users’ perceptions of and understanding of the extent of
trackers on the web. Taking these factors into account is important
for the usability of such tools so that users can be aware and protect
themselves to a reasonable and necessary extent that aligns with
their overall comfort with trackers.
In this paper, we elicit user perceptions and preferences about
different trackers on various websites through an online survey of
43 users. We use this data to bootstrap a privacy scoring system.
This scoring systemweights the usage of trackers and the dispersion
of user data within a page to third parties, with the type of website
being visited. Our work presents a proof-of-concept methodology
and tool to calculate a user-centric privacy score with preliminary
bootstrap user data. We conclude with concrete future directions.
1 INTRODUCTION
Third-party trackers (TPT) are present on almost every website [12].
TPTs allow websites to track their visitors across multiple digital
services in order to serve more targeted content [29, 33]. While
useful, these trackers induce privacy risks into the websites for its
visitors.
Improving the detection of TPTs has been a topic of much inves-
tigation in the research community [19, 33]. Additionally, browser
extensions–e.g., Ghostery, AdBlockPlus [3, 35]–detect tracking
URLs or ads within a website and display them to the user, some-
times blocking the URLs from even being loaded. Previous work and
existing tools have been useful to prevent advanced trackers from
operating on websites and to inform users of how much tracking
is occurring during their browsing; however, none of these tools
are able to 1) quantify the privacy of a website according to what
average users perceive to be sensitive or 2) inform these users of
privacy-violating website components such that they can reason-
ably assess a website’s privacy in comparison to other websites
they visit.
In this paper, we take a step towards being able to quantify
the privacy of a website in a user-centric way. We first conduct a
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survey of 43 participants on Amazon Mechanical Turk [4] asking
participants about their awareness of different kinds of trackers,
their comfort with these trackers, and for what purposes they would
not be okay with a specific tracker being used by a website. Using
the results of the survey, we implement a privacy scoring algorithm
in a browser extension that determines which trackers are present
on the page running the extension. The extension assigns higher or
lower scores for different tracking components based on the comfort
or allowance participants in the study overall reported with certain
types of websites along with the amount of third parties operating
the trackers on the page.
Our contributions, though preliminary, provide a proof-of-
concept system to quantify privacy in a way meaningful to users,
and to empower users to assess their privacy on websites.
We next provide some background about TPTs (Sec. 2) and re-
lated work (Sec. 3). The following two sections describe both the
user study and results (Sec. 4) and the design and implementa-
tion of the privacy scoring mechanism (Sec. 5). We conclude with
limitations and future work (Sec. 6).
2 BACKGROUND ON TPTS
Third-party trackers (TPTs) are web components placed onto a
webpage and tracked by an external domain. For example, a known
website may include scripts from other domains who want to
track users’ behavior on that website, e.g., a TPT in the form of a
cookie [1].
In our work, we study the following eight categories of TPTs
according to their purpose and functionality [35]:
(1) Session Replay: TPTs that track users’ view (browser or
screen output), user input (keyboard and mouse inputs), and
logs of network events or console logs.
(2) Adult advertising: TPTs that track users’ browsing behav-
ior on adult websites for adult ad retargeting and behavioral
advertising.
(3) Social media: TPTs that study users’ browsing behavior on
other websites to better target users on their social media
platform.
(4) Analytics: Most general-purpose TPTs that track website
usage across different webpages. For example, these trackers
may examine browsing behavior to empower cross-platform
tracking or recording demographics information (e.g. age,
gender, location).
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(5) Advertising: TPTs that track users’ browsing behavior on
websites for ad retargeting and behavioral advertising.
(6) Comments: TPTs that identify users in comment sections
of webpages, including articles and product reviews.
(7) Audio and video player: TPTs that track users’ behavior
when interacting with video and audio content.
(8) Customer interaction: TPTs that enable e-commerce
shops to assist users through a pop-up chat box when their
mouse is idle while shopping online.
3 RELATEDWORK
There has been a multitude of prior research studying third-party
trackers and defenses against tracking.
Many researchers have conducted longitudinal studies to study
the extent of tracking on the web and the extent of overall privacy-
violating web components [12, 13, 15, 18–21, 23–26, 28, 33]. Re-
searchers have also developed a number of methodologies and tools
for measuring tracking at this scale [11]. Beyond this, improving
the detection of trackers has been an extensively studied topic [33],
also in the context of advertisements [8, 32] and privacy-violating
web components in general [23–26].
There is also a large body of work aimed at implementing
defenses against web tracking [33]. These methods range from
privacy-preserving advertisements [14, 16, 37] to privacy protec-
tion on social media [10, 22, 34].
With respect to the end-user, there have been a number of studies
to understand users’ perceptions of web tracking [9, 27, 30, 31,
36, 38]. Additionally, researchers have aimed to comprehensively
quantify the privacy of websites and have built tools to usably
inform users of violations [17]. These works serve as motivation
for our work to design a privacy-quantifying system that takes the
users’ perceptions into account, which has not been studied before.
4 ELICITING USER PERCEPTIONS
In this section, we describe our user study to elicit user perceptions
of trackers on different types of websites.
4.1 Methodology
To collect data about what types of tracking users are comfort-
able with on different websites, we conducted a survey on Amazon
Mechanical Turk [4] (approved by our institution’s ethics board).
The survey roughly followed this pattern: for each TPT category
described in Sec. 2, we constructed a scenario describing how com-
panies use the TPTs in the category, without requiring any prior
knowledge from the respondent. For each scenario, we asked partic-
ipants 1) if they were aware of the type of tracking in the scenario,
2) about their comfort with knowing that the website runs this kind
of tracking, and 3) which kind of websites they think should not use
the tracking services described in the scenario (website categories
described in Table 3). See App. A for the full survey.
The survey took less than ten minutes to complete and partici-
pants were compensated with $2.
4.2 Results
Our study had 43 participants. 56% of participants identified as
male, the rest identifying as female. The ages of participants ranged
from the 18-30 bracket to the 60+ bracket.
Due to the small sample size, we do not perform any statistical
analyses on the responses to the survey. Furthermore, the primary
purpose of the user data is to bootstrap the privacy scoring system
(described in Sec. 5). However, we report some descriptive statistics
of the survey results.
Looking at the number of participants who reported to be ei-
ther “somewhat uncomfortable” or “very uncomfortable” with each
type of tracker, we rank users’ sensitivity to each category and
use this ranking of sensitivity to assign a score to each category
used to compute a privacy score (described later in Sec. 5). As we
hypothesized, session replay is the type of TPT people are the least
comfortable with and customer interaction was the TPT category
users were most comfortable with.
Table 1 shows the extent of unawareness for each TPT category.
Again, as hypothesized, session replay was also the least known
TPT.
TPT type % of participants unaware
Session replay 61%
Comment 58%
Analytics 46%
Adult advertising 42%
Audio and video player 33%
Social media 26%
Customer interaction 16%
Advertising 13%
Table 1: Percentage of users who were unaware of the type
of tracking
Name Adobe Audience Manager
Pattern demdex.net
Category Advertisement
Parent company Adobe
Table 2: Example of stored information about a known TPT
5 BUILDING A PRIVACY SCORING SYSTEM
In this section we describe a privacy scoring mechanism based
on the results of the user study described in Section 4, wherein
a higher privacy score implies a higher amount of privacy. The
overall system has two components: a database server and a browser
extension which computes the score.
5.1 Database server
The database server is built from user-elicited data and general
information about websites and TPTs. The following describes the
sets of data stored on the server:
• Categories of websites: The server returns one of 11 do-
main categories (Table 3) in response to a request containing
the domain of the URL visited by a browser.
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• URL patterns for known TPT URLs: The server returns
a list of patterns of known TPTs that URLs can be matched
against in addition to each TPT’s category.
• Blacklist of TPT types: The server returns whether a TPT
type detected was “blacklisted” on the domain category. We
determine this blacklist based on the survey results when
users indicated that they thought a certain type of TPT
should not be used on a certain type of domain. For example,
users indicated that advertising TPTs should not be used on
adult domains, implying “advertising” TPTs are blacklisted
for adult domains.
Category Example
Adult www.pornhub.com
Banking www.bankofamerica.com
E-commerce www.underarmour.com
Educational www.cmu.edu
Healthcare www.upmc.com
News www.cnn.com
Non-Governmental Organization www.worldwildlife.org
Political www.donaldjtrump.com
Social Media www.facebook.com
Subscription-Based Service www.spotify.com
Other (non e-commerce) www.sunoco.com
Table 3: Domain categories and examples
To populate this categorymapping, we analyzed 49 safe-for-work
websites from the Alexa top 50 sites list in November 2018 [2] and
manually identified TPT URLs included within the page source. To
classify domains, multiple authors browsed the internet normally
for three days (recording visited URLs) and were able to manually
label 122 distinct domains according to one of the 11 categories.
We further analyzed the source of these 122 domain webpages to
expand our list of TPT matches and ended up with 187 TPT URL
patterns1 in total.
5.2 Browser extension to compute the privacy
score
The overall privacy score computed by the extension is based on
users’ comfort with the usage of different trackers in different
contexts in addition to the extent of dispersion of user data within
a page to third parties.
First, the browser fetches the category of the domain from the
server. Next, the browser requests a list of known TPT patterns and
a list of blacklisted TPTs for the domain category. After fetching
this information, the extension then identifies all HTTP requests
made by the page that match any of the TPT URL patterns. A score
is computed for each detected TPT. This TPT score is interpreted
in the opposite direction of how the overall privacy score should
be interpreted, i.e., the TPT score will be higher when the page
contains a higher number of privacy-violating components or when
users’ data is being shared with a higher number of unique third
parties, i.e., less privacy. The TPT score is calculated for each TPT
URL by first making use of a base score assigned to the TPT’s
1We construct a URL pattern to be a regex matching a domain and optionally some
part of the TPT URL’s path. See Table 2 for examples of TPT patterns.
Figure 1: Flow of the browser extension
category. Table 4 contains the listing of base scores for each TPT
category based on the ranking of comfort described in Sec. 4. The
TPT score is first initialized to the base score for the TPT category.
If the TPT category is blacklisted for the domain category, the TPT
score is increased by a factor of 1.5. The extension then checks if
the company operating the TPT in question operating more than
one TPT on the same web page. If so, we interpret the user’s data
to have a lower extent of dispersion (since this limits the amount of
unique domains tracking user data) and decrease the TPT score by
1. The computed TPT scores for each TPT are then added together
to form an aggregate TPT score for the page (aдд_score).
The extension sends aдд_score and the domain’s category to
the server. The server compares this score against 1) previously
computed scores for all the other domains in the category of the do-
main in question and 2) previously computed scores for all domains
seen before. We compute the following two percentile values based
on the scores in the above two groups: categorical percentile:, i.e.,
the percentile of the browser-calculated score with respect to how
many scores in the first category the calculated score is higher than
(i.e., exhibits less privacy than); and a global percentile, i.e., similar
to the categorical percentile except compared with the scores in the
second category. The two percentile values are averaged and the
final privacy score is computed by subtracting this average from
100, giving us a privacy score percentage between 1 and 100 (see
Algorithm 1 for a full description).
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The flow of the browser extension is shown in Figure 1. App. B
contains screenshots of the browser extension in action, which we
named “Cookie Police”. In addition to a score, the extension reports
how the website compares to other websites in its category and
other sites, as well as the companies operating trackers on the site.
TPT Type Base score
Session Replay 8
Adult Advertising 7
Social Media 6
Analytics 5
Advertising 4
Comments 3
Audio and Video Player 2
Customer Interaction 1
Table 4: Base score for each TPT category
6 LIMITATIONS AND FUTUREWORK
Our work is subject to limitations due to limited resources and
budget and therefore, lends to ample future work.
The sample size of survey respondents was not large enough to
build a representative model of user perceptions used to compute
privacy scores or to study small effects of statistical significance.
Additionally, our respondents were all US residents. Future work
should study perceptions of tracking privacy on a large scale, pos-
sibly even across countries, and build the scoring system based on
more representative data. Alternatively, the score can be computed
on an individual basis or on a population basis (e.g., per country),
i.e., the score for one user or population is uniquely based on data
collected by that user or population.
We assigned a category to a domain bymanual labeling of a small
set of domains. If the scoring extension is deployed in the wild, this
manual categorization is not scalable. Future work should use an
automatic categorization such as Amazon’s Alexa Web Information
Services (AWIS) [5], SimilarWeb’s Website Categorization API [7],
or Google’s natural language content classification [6] and accord-
ingly update the user study questions with the categories of interest.
Furthermore, there is no existing database of recognized TPT URL
patterns. Therefore, we use the labels produced by other tracking
detection tools on a set of URLs as our ground truth for generating
URL patterns. Future work could study how to automatically gen-
erate TPT-matching regular expressions from historical data and
other tools, which automatically update over time. Additionally, the
research community could benefit from collectively maintaining
a public database of known TPT URL patterns implemented by
various extensions.
The scoring algorithm is based on aggregate user perception.
This lends to possible deviations from the perceptions of a specific
user who might have outlying perceptions. Future work could
implement such a scoring extension with a feedback mechanism,
wherein users are able to provide feedback on certain aspects of
the score or provide custom answers to some of the questions in
the user study.
Future work should involve usability testing and a systematic
evaluation of accuracy of a more sophisticated version of our tool.
This would involve testing general usability, testing a feedback
mechanism as mentioned above, evaluating the accuracy of the
TPT filters and evaluating the extent of evasion of the TPT patterns
in the wild. Related to this, future work should ensure that the
detection of TPT URLs is comparable to the detection by state-of-
the-art tools (e.g. Ghostery) or should use the detection system
employed by such tools either through any APIs or open-source
implementations.
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A SURVEY
With the rapid development and growth of the Internet, marketers
are turning from physical marketing techniques (e.g. sending flyers
to your home) to online marketing techniques. With online market-
ing techniques, marketers are better able to target their advertising
to customers, thus reducing users annoyance from receiving adver-
tising that is not relevant to the users. In order to achieve certain
levels of personalization, online marketers make use of different
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third-party tracking tools. These third-party tracking tools may be
considered by some as "privacy-invasive".
In the following pages, we will present you with 7 short scenarios
explaining how each category of third-party tracking tools work.
Following each scenario, we will ask how you feel about the use of
such tools being used on websites that you might commonly visit.
We will also ask you whether you think it is okay for some websites
to use such tools or not.
You must be at least 18 years of age to take part in this survey.
A.1 Demographics
What gender do you identify with?
(1) Female
(2) Male
(3) Other
(4) I prefer not to disclose this information
What age group are you in?
(1) 18 - 30
(2) 31 - 45
(3) 46 - 60
(4) 60+
(5) I prefer not to disclose this information
[We present the user with each scenario in the next section. The
following section contains the three questions we ask about each
of these scenarios.]
A.2 Scenarios
(1) A website X shares the fact that you are accessing website
X, to company Y. Company Y adapts its advertisements on
other websites based on the newfound fact that you have
visited website X.
(2) An adult website X shares the fact that you are accessing
website X, to company Y. Company Y is an adult advertising
company. Company Y pays other adult websites for space on
their page. This lets company Y show you advertisements it
thinks would be of interest to you. Company Y adapts its ad-
vertisements on other adult websites based on the newfound
fact that you have accessed website X.
(3) A website X uses company Y’s service to identify your age,
location, gender and device type when you are on their web-
site X. Furthermore, website X is able to identify you when
you access website X from a different device (e.g. smartphone
or computer).
(4) A website X uses company YâĂŹs service to record all your
mouse movements and everything you type into website
X, so that website X can reconstruct how you interacted
with the website (think of website X screen-recording your
browsing session while on website X) in order to improve
the usability of Website X.
(5) A website X uses company Y’s service to interact live with
you through live-chat. When website X detects that you
are idle (not moving your mouse) for some time, a chat-box
appears on the right bottom corner of your screen, asking if
you need assistance.
(6) A website X includes a video player by video platform Y on
their website X. By loading website X’s page, video platform
Y knows that you are accessing website X. The next time
you go on video platform Y, they suggest videos for you to
watch based on the video you watched on website X.
(7) A website X includes social media Y’s "share" button to let
you share their website X’s content to your social media Y
profile. However, even if you choose not to "share" anything,
by loading website X’s page, social media Y knows that you
are accessing website X. The next time you go on social
media Y, they show ads based on the newfound fact that you
visited website X.
(8) A website X uses company Y’s service to provide a com-
ment/review section on their website. The next time you go
on another website using company Y’s service, you could be
prevented from posting comments if you posted an "unde-
sirable" comment (e.g. spam) before on website X.
A.3 Questions for each scenario
(1) Before reading the above scenario, were you aware that
companies do this type of tracking?
• Yes
• No
(2) Based on the above scenario, how comfortable do you feel
knowing that website X does this?
(a) Very comfortable
(b) Somewhat comfortable
(c) Neutral
(d) Somewhat uncomfortable
(e) Very uncomfortable
(3) What types of websites do you think should not inform
company Y of your visit, as described in the above scenario
(check all that apply)?
• E-Commerce (online shop) [e.g. Under Armour]
• Social Media Platform [e.g. Facebook]
• News [e.g. CNN]
• Banking [e.g. Wells Fargo]
• Educational Institutions [e.g. MIT]
• Health Care [e.g. UPMC]
• Political [e.g. Donald J Trump]
• Non Governmental Organizations [e.g. PETA]
• Subscription-Based Services [e.g. Spotify]
• Adult Websites
• Other companies (non e-commerce) [e.g. Chili’s]
• All of the above
• None of the above
You have reached the end of the survey. Thank you for your
participation!
B SCREENSHOTS OF THE BROWSER
EXTENSION
Figure 2 depicts screenshots of the browser extension on a banking
website.
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Figure 2: Screenshots of the extension’s report
7
